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Recent social neuroscientific evidence indicates that implicit and explicit inferences on the
mind of another person (i.e., intentions, attributions or traits), are subserved by a shared
mentalizing network. Under both implicit and explicit instructions, ERP studies reveal that
early inferences occur at about the same time, and fMRI studies demonstrate an overlap
in core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). These results suggest a rapid shared implicit intuition followed
by a slower explicit verification processes (as revealed by additional brain activation
during explicit vs. implicit inferences). These data provide support for a default-adjustment
dual-process framework of social mentalizing.
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INTRODUCTION
Tell me what you did today, and I’ll tell what you want and who
you are. Behaviors are quite often the main road to enter people’s
mind, to infer their intentions and judge their personality traits.
Social inferences that rely on insights about other people’s mental
content such as intentions, desires, beliefs, traits or other high-
level characteristics are termed mentalizing inferences. Contrary
to the old idea that such complex inferences need a lot of explicit
mental elaboration, behavioral research in the 80s (Winter and
Uleman, 1984) documented that such person inferences, includ-
ing trait inferences, are often made implicitly and automatically,
without awareness or control about the inference process. The fas-
cination for such implicit and rapid inferences comes from the
fact they are relatively correct based on brief verbal or non-verbal
information (Letzring et al., 2006), although they may at times
differ from explicit inferences. What is the true inference then?
The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate that current neu-
roscientific evidence on mentalizing suggests that implicit and
explicit person inferences do not rely on strictly distinct neural
processes or substrates.
To explain the distinction between implicit and explicit social
judgments, social cognition researchers drew parallels with sim-
ilar distinctions in cognitive psychology, collectively termed
dual-process theories (for reviews see Evans, 2008; Evans and
Stanovich, 2013). Dual-process theories argue that there are
two different modes of processing, termed implicit (also termed
unconscious, automatic, spontaneous, experiential, heuristic,
intuitive, impulsive, and reflexive) and explicit (also termed con-
scious, controlled, rational, systematic, analytical, and reflective;
Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Chaicken, 1980; Epstein, 1994;
Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Lieberman, 2007). The key feature
of dual-process theories is that implicit processes are inacces-
sible to consciousness and control, while explicit processes are
accessible to awareness, introspection and flexible control. It is
also assumed that implicit processes are rapid, while explicit
processes are slow (Evans, 2008). Some dual-process theorists
in social cognition (and other domains) assume that implicit
and explicit processes are subserved by different information
processing systems (e.g., associative vs. rule-based; Smith and
DeCoster, 2000) or subserved by different brain areas (e.g.,
Satpute and Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Forbes and
Grafman, 2013).
DO DUAL PROCESSES IMPLY DISTINCT NETWORKS?
Behavioral research in social cognition accumulated a growing
body of evidence in favor of dual-process models by demon-
strating that many person inferences occur not always explic-
itly, but often implicitly (for a review, Uleman, 1999). Recent
findings demonstrate that representing other agents’ beliefs, is
an implicit capacity acquired early at 7 month of age (Kovacs
et al., 2010) and implicitly sustained during adulthood (Schneider
et al., 2012a), although it requires some minimal executive
resources (Qureshi et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2012b). However,
the idea that implicit and explicit social mentalizing are sub-
served by distinct and exclusive processing systems or brain
networks appears unjustified. True, some neural networks are
mainly involved in implicit social processing. Recent neurosci-
entific research has uncovered subcortical mechanisms located
in the amygdala and other limbic structures that elicit primi-
tive affective reactions (e.g., rapid impressions of a face; Todorov
et al., 2008a,b; Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011; Forbes
et al., 2012), as well as mirror-like neural networks respon-
sible for the understanding of non-verbal movements and
actions of humans (Iacoboni, 2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009).
In contrast, it is acknowledged that higher-level mentaliz-
ing brain areas subserve computations that are neither exclu-
sively implicit or explicit (Satpute and Lieberman, 2006; Keysers
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and Gazzola, 2007; Forbes and Grafman, 2013). On the con-
trary, the content of the social inference process seems more
crucial than the nature of the process. Each core area in the
mentalizing network seems responsible for a distinct compu-
tation and appears sensitive to a specific input. The temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) seems responsible for judgments on
temporary beliefs and intentions, while the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) seems involved in enduring trait inferences
and other stable characteristics (Figure 1; see for reviews,
Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; Lombardo et al.,
2011; Bzdok et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012). Each of these
areas supports computations of specific social judgments, but
none seems predominantly recruited for explicit or implicit
inferences.
FIGURE 1 | Grand-averaged ERP waveforms showing positive
deflections at the central midline (Cz) scalp sites given spontaneous
and intentional instructions. The timeline is given in ms. A positive
amplitude is shown downward. (A) Goal inferences: Goal-consistent words
diverge significantly from goal-irrelevant and no-goal words at about 250ms
(p < 0.05) as indicated by the arrows. Insets: LORETA source analysis of
the TPJ at 250–300ms. Adapted with permission from Van der Cruyssen
et al. (2009). Copyright 2008 by Psychology Press. (B) Trait inferences:
Trait-consistent words diverge significantly from trait-inconsistent words at
about 600ms (p < 0.05) as indicated by the arrows. Insets: LORETA source
analysis of the TPJ and mPFC at 600ms. Adapted with permission from
Van Duynslaeger et al. (2007). Copyright 2007 by Oxford Press.
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT MENTALIZING SHARE EARLY
TIMING AND CORE BRAIN AREAS
Methods that were commonly used to explore implicit processes
in behavioral research, cannot always be directly adapted for
neuroimaging research. For instance, subliminal presentation of
stories or picture sequences to depict events is impossible, while
the use of cognitive load may trigger unwanted neural processes
that may interfere with the social inference task (e.g., Qureshi
et al., 2010). To illustrate, in contrast to passively watching or
explicitly empathizing with another person while reading social
information, Morelli and Lieberman (2013) found reduced activ-
ity in the TPJ and mPFC when participants were instructed
to memorize simultaneously an irrelevant number. Moreover,
cognitive load by memorizing further increased activity in a
host of areas related to episodic memory and executive con-
trol (i.e., precuneus, dorsal anterior and middle cingulate, lateral
PFC and inferior parietal cortex). Critically, these increased acti-
vations occurred in comparison to either explicit or implicit
mentalizing instructions, demonstrating that unlike behavioral
research, cognitive load by a secondary task may actually compli-
cate the understanding of neural processes rather than clarifying
it. However, the mere presentation of behavioral descriptions
that invite most participants to spontaneously infer a social goal,
belief or trait under implicit reading instructions, as opposed
to explicitly instructions to make these inferences, avoids these
methodological difficulties. Nevertheless, passively reading (as
well as secondary tasks) cannot eliminate entirely the possibil-
ity that some amount of explicit mentalizing might still occur.
Using this approach, recent neuroimaging research converges on
the view that there is a common underlying mentalizing network
that is relatively blind to the implicit or explicit nature of the
inference, and that seems more sensitive to the content of the
inference.
ERP TIMING: AN IDENTICAL ONSET FOR IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT
INFERENCES
Van Overwalle and colleagues documented that the neural tim-
ing (measured by event-related potentials or ERPs) of an early
social inference is almost identical under implicit or explicit pro-
cessing. Under implicit instructions, the participants were told
that they had to “read carefully” the material, while participants
under explicit instructions had to answer repeatedly the question:
“what is the [inference] of this person?” Participants were divided
in two separate groups, to avoid contamination of the explicit
instructions on implicit judgments. Participants read a number
of sentences that all implied the same inference (e.g., “nice” as a
trait), and thus provided a strong impression on the target person.
At the end of the trial, a critical sentence was presented that was
either consistent with the earlier inference (e.g., “gave her sister
a hug”), inconsistent (e.g., “gave her brother a slap”), or neu-
tral (e.g., “gave her mother a bottle”). Because timing is crucial in
ERP research, the sentences were presented word-by-word in the
middle of the screen, and ERP timing started at the beginning of
the critical word (see italics in the examples above) that diverged
between conditions.
A first ERP study on goal inferences (Van der Cruyssen et al.,
2009) reported that goal inferences were made after about 250ms,
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again irrespective of the implicit or explicit instruction (see
the significant divergence of wave patterns under consistent vs.
inconsistent conditions, Figure 1A). A second ERP study on trait
inferences (Van Duynslaeger et al., 2007) documented that the
onset of trait inferences occurs at about 600ms irrespective of
instructions (Figure 1B). Source localization of the ERP waves
suggested that the core mentalizing areas (TPJ and mPFC) were
most strongly recruited (Figure 1 insets, using LORETA, Pascual-
Marqui et al., 1994; Pascual-Marqui, 1999). Together, these result
seems to provide support for a core single-system account with an
identical onset at the beginning of mentalizing. Interestingly, the
results also reveal that goal inferences are faster than trait infer-
ences, consistent with the proposition by Van Overwalle (2009)
that goals involve a quick evaluation of the here-and-now by the
TPJ, while traits reflect slower abstractions by the mPFC extracted
from behaviors identified in the TPJ (see also Van Overwalle et al.,
2011; Ma et al., 2012b).
fMRI LOCALIZATION: OVERLAP BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT
INFERENCES
Van Overwalle and colleagues conducted a series of functional
imaging studies to explore the overlap between explicit and
implicit mentalizing, using a very similar procedure as described
before. The results showed significant overlap in mentalizing
activity between instructions, even though brains from different
participants were compared.
A first fMRI study on implicit and explicit trait inferences (Ma
et al., 2011) revealed common activation in the left TPJ, mPFC
and bilateral temporal pole (Figure 2A). This overlap was sta-
tistically significant for the TPJ, indicating a reliable common
process across brains from different individuals. Importantly,
there were also differences between instructions. Implicit trait
inferences significantly recruited only the core mentalizing areas
of the TPJ and mPFC, whereas explicit trait inferences addition-
ally recruited other brain areas involved in mentalizing, including
the precuneus (autobiographicmemory) and posterior part of the
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; biological motion). Analogous
findings were reported by Rameson et al. (2010) for implicit and
explicit self-descriptions.
In a second fMRI study on person and situation causes
(Kestemont et al., 2013), there was an overlap between implicit
and explicit instructions in the bilateral TPJ and pSTS, and
the precuneus, which was significant for the TPJ and pSTS
(Figure 2B). Again, there were also differences. Only implicit
inferences increased the activation of the mPFC, suggesting a
tendency to make dispositional trait attributions to the person
irrespective of the situational circumstances that may have con-
strained or induced the behavior of the agent, known as the
fundamental attribution bias (Moran et al., unpublished). This
biased activation of the mPFC was absent under explicit instruc-
tions, consistent with decreased biased processing documented in
behavioral research (Gilbert and Malone, 1995) and neuroimag-
ing (Brosch et al., 2013).
In a third fMRI study on trait inconsistencies (Ma et al.,
2012a), a significant overlap was found in the dorsal part of the
mPFC (Figure 2C). Like in the previous trait study, some brain
areas were more active only under explicit instructions, including
FIGURE 2 | Various social inferences under spontaneous (green) and
intentional (red) instructions, and their overlap (yellow). (A) Consistent
trait > irrelevant trait contrast from Ma et al. (2011) with significant
conjunction in the left TPJ (MNI coordinates −58 −58 32). (B) Person
Cause > Baseline and Situation Cause > Baseline conjunction from
Kestemont et al. (2013) with significant conjunction in the bilateral TPJ and
pSTS (respective MNI coordinates 46 −56 20; −50 −54 18; 52 −56 14;
−50 −56 16). (C) Inconsistent trait > Consistent trait contrast from Ma
et al. (2012a) with significant conjunction in the mPFC (MNI coordinates
4 42 32). In all analyses, whole-brain activation was thresholded at
p < 0.005 (uncorrected) with at least 10 voxels. Circles indicate regions of
interest with significant activation after FDR correction at p < 0.10. vmPFC,
ventral part of the mPFC; dmPFC, dorsal part of the mPFC; pmFC, posterior
frontal cortex; PFC, lateral prefrontal cortex.
the left TPJ and pSTS (biological motion) and the precuneus
(autobiographic memory). Interestingly, both instructions also
revealed a non-significant overlap in the posterior medial frontal
cortex (pmFC, including the dorsal part of the anterior cingu-
late cortex—dACC) and the right PFC. These latter two areas are
part of a domain-general conflict monitoring network (Botvinick
et al., 2004). Botvinick et al. (2004) proposed that this network
detects and resolves conflicts between multiple inputs, and sug-
gested that the pmFC detects inconsistencies, while the lateral
PFC resolves these by modifying the attention to the different
conflicting inputs.
The findings converge on the notion that under explicit pro-
cessing, implicit information is enriched by retrieving similar
behaviors from the past and imaging more vividly social cues on
human action (Ma et al., 2011, 2012a), or by taking in more sit-
uational information so that a biased attribution in favor of the
person is avoided (Kestemont et al., 2013). However, a limita-
tion of current neuroimaging studies on social mentalizing is that
they do not present direct evidence to support the interpretation
that additional brain activation during explicit judgments reflect
verification or correction after a default intuitive response. There
is, however, some neuroimaging evidence on racial attitudes
demonstrating this correction process, to avoid stereotypic biases.
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When White egalitarian-motivated people were confronted with
Black out-group faces (Cunningham et al., 2004; Forbes et al.,
2012), the amygdala was activated only under short (∼30ms)
but not under long presentations times (∼500ms). The finding
that amygdala activation correlated with a behavioral test of racial
attitudes suggests that the initial amygdala response was biased,
while later explicit processing reevaluate out-group members in a
non-biased manner.
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT MENTALIZING AS ITERATIVE
REPROCESSING
Taken together, recent neuroscientific data on the neural under-
pinnings of social mentalizing suggest that implicit and explicit
mentalizing share the same early timing and the same core brain
areas, but also that explicit inferences may lead to a modulation in
some brain areas, reflecting a correction or an enrichment. These
data are best explained by more recent default-interventionist
dual-process theories (Evans, 2011). These dual-process theories
argue that implicit processes may provide a quick default solution
to an assessment (resulting in an identical timing of early infer-
ences), which may afterwards be either accepted or corrected by
explicit reasoning (resulting in longer processing times overall).
Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) proposed an interesting imple-
mentation of this idea which they termed iterative reprocessing.
According to these authors, processing occurs on a continuum
from relatively implicit to relatively explicit. Increased explicit
processing is possible through additional reprocessing cycles,
which enables more explicit elaboration of information along
a wider and richer range of contexts and constraints, retriev-
ing input from increasingly more brain structures. Inferences
are hierarchically arranged, so that lower-level processes continu-
ously provide valenced information, while higher-order processes
recruited during subsequent cycles render the inference more
explicit. With each iteration cycle, information is passed back
and forth between the lower-level and higher-level computations
(Cunningham et al., 2007). According to some theories of con-
sciousness, these additional cycles bring the inference process
closer to a steady neural attractor state that is accessible to intro-
spection (Dennett, 2001; Timmermans et al., 2012). This iterative
cycling theory has been implemented in multilevel bidirectional
connectionist computer models of person construal (Freeman
and Ambady, 2011) and attitude formation (Ehret et al., unpub-
lished), in which a continuous interaction between lower and
higher-level social information dynamically leads to stable per-
son construals (Freeman and Ambady, 2011) and attitudes about
them (Ehret et al., unpublished).
It is suggested here that social mentalizing involves similar
iterative reprocessing from implicit to explicit (Cunningham and
Zelazo, 2007; Freeman and Ambady, 2011). Inferences based
on one or a few cycles are relatively implicit and crude intu-
itions, leaving an early mark in the ERPs and activation in
restricted core brain areas. In contrast, inferences based on
additional iterations and computations are increasingly rich,
balanced and relatively explicit, leaving a broader trace of acti-
vation in multiple brain areas. Social inferences are hierarchically
arranged, with lower-level brain areas (e.g., amygdala) continu-
ously providing valenced information (Todorov et al., 2008a,b;
Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011) and moderate-level inter-
pretations of behaviors (e.g., TPJ) sending information on the
agent’s intentions, which feeds higher-level interpretations of the
agent in terms of traits (e.g., mPFC; Van Overwalle, 2009; Ma
et al., 2012b). These higher-order inferences are recruited dur-
ing additional processing cycles which make it more likely that
situational information is considered and biases are corrected.
How these subsequent cycles touch on novel input and mem-
ories, and how this information is integrated and feed back to
implicit intuitions at the neural level, are questions for future
research. Moreover, it is likely that individual differences in moti-
vation or need for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996; Roets and
Van Hiel, 2007, 2011) determine how much cycles are processed
until an inference is terminated. Or does this depend more on
situational opportunities?
Apart from these basic questions on iterative reprocessing
of implicit and explicit mentalizing (Cunningham and Zelazo,
2007; Freeman and Ambady, 2011), there are also novel neuro-
scientific findings that can be viewed from this perspective. For
instance, recent research demonstrated that the ventral mPFC
locates a trait code (Ma et al., 2013), that is, a distributed mem-
ory that encodes trait information and, when activated, enable
access to this stored information (Wood and Grafman, 2003;
Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). The trait code is assumed to
have several links to typical behaviors that exemplify the trait,
and so facilitate easy understanding and trait attribution on
the basis of behavior alone. This suggests that the trait code
allows easy access already during early implicit processing (as
an intuition). As another example, novel evidence on the role
of the dorsal mPFC reveals that this area is strongly involved in
generating high construals, that is, abstract categories extracted
from lower-level behavior or object information (Baetens et al.,
2013). As such, it appears to be the ideal candidate for high-level
abstraction in an iterative reprocessing framework. An obvious
prediction is that this abstraction function is mainly accessible in
explicit as opposed to implicit processing, because only repetitive
cycling might allow to reach complex abstractions and aware-
ness about them. Finally, there is also novel evidence on the role
of the dorsal mPFC in social working memory (Meyer et al.,
2012). Keeping an increasing number of individuals in mind, also
increased activity of the dorsal mPFC. Future research can explore
how social working memory fits with an iterative reprocessing
framework.
CONCLUSION
Previous neuroscientific research has demonstrated that under-
standing of another persons’ mind involves both implicit and
explicit processes located in the mentalizing network (e.g.,
Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). The old idea still present in some
dual-process theories that implicit and explicit thought is inflex-
ibly driven by entirely different underlying systems and brain
areas (Smith and DeCoster, 2000; Strack and Deutsch, 2004) is
contradicted by recent ERP and fMRI findings on mentalizing.
Under implicit and explicit processing instructions, there was
a shared early timing (ERP studies) and shared brain activity
(fMRI studies) pointing to a single core system of social men-
talizing (Van Overwalle, 2009). These data can be explained by
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a default-interventionist dual process (Evans, 2008) in terms
of iterative reprocessing (Cunningham and Zelazo, 2007;
Cunningham et al., 2007; Freeman and Ambady, 2011).
According to this framework, there is an implicit default core
process that allows observers to make quick social mentalizing
inferences, presumably based on pre-existing learned social
knowledge. This implicit core process is subserved by the TPJ and
mPFC. Subsequent reprocessing cycles allow to take in more and
richer information which enable observers to verify and flexibly
correct their original rapid intuition.
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